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COMMENTS

MATERNAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE: DOES OHIO HAVE AN
ANSWER?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A crisis of increasing magnitude is currently facing the American
public. Maternal substance abuse 1 endangers the lives of many American women of childbearing age, as well as the lives of their unborn
children. 2 Recent studies have shown that the rate of substance abuse
among pregnant women ranges from 7.5 percent to 11 percent. 3 Further, an estimated 385,000 cocaine-affected babies were born in 1988
alone.4 The appropriate response to this crisis is currently a topic of
heated debate. 5 The central issue of the debate is whether to address
the problem of maternal substance abuse through existing legal channels' or to amend current statutes specifically to criminalize such
1. The term "maternal substance abuse" in this note refers to the use of illicit controlled
substances by a woman during pregnancy. This note focuses on women who abuse cocaine and
"crack" cocaine and not upon women who abuse other illicit substances or alcohol. For a thorough
discussion on women and alcohol abuse, see Sam J. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The
Need to Provide Legal Protection For the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1987).
2. See Douglas J. Besharov, Whose Life Is It Anyway?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1991, at 15
(discussing effects of prenatal drug exposure on the fetus); Wendy Chavkin & Stephen R.
Kandall, Between A "Rock" and a Hard Place: PerinatalDrug Abuse, 85 PEDIATRICS 223 (1990)
(suggesting that the incidence of substance abuse in pregnancy is on the rise).
3. Terry A. Adirim & Nandini Sen Gupta, A NationalSurvey of State Maternal and Newborn Drug Testing and Reporting Policies, 106 DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. PUB.
HEALTH REP. 292 (May-June 1991).
4. See Mark Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, 76 A.B.A.J. 50, 51 (Mar. 1990) (noting
that the "number of cocaine-exposed babies has more than tripled since 1985").
5. See Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of
Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 277
(1987-88); Joyce L. Terres, Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: How Should the Government Intervene?,
18 AM. J. CRIM_ L. 61 (1990); Michelle D. Wilkins, Comment, Solving the Problem of Prenatal
Substance Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401
(1990).
6. See, John E.B. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23
DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1984); Deborah A. Wainey, The Use of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and Restraining Authority to Address the Problem of Maternal Drug Abuse in Ohio, 17 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 611 (1991); Judith Kahn, Note, Of Women's First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care
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abuse.' Another major issue of this debate focuses upon the constituright of the
tional rights of the mother versus the alleged constitutional
8
fetus to be born with a sound mind and body.
Three major decisions reported in Ohio have addressed the problem of maternal substance abuse.9 Two of these cases originated in the
juvenile court system.10 The third case involved the prosecution of a
mother for the criminal endangering" of her infant due to prenatal
substance abuse. 2 Taken together, these cases exemplify the currently
existing uncertainty over the appropriate method with which to address
this crisis. Recently, legislation has been introduced into the Ohio General Assembly in an attempt to address the crisis. 3
This comment analyzes the problems. currently facing the Ohio
courts and the Ohio General Assembly in dealing with the problem of
maternal substance abuse. Section II of this comment provides background information on the problem of maternal substance abuse with
the major focus on cocaine and "crack" cocaine. Section III analyzes
the currently reported case law in Ohio on this issue. Section IV ana-

to her Fetus-Is This A Mother's Crime, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 807 (1987); Note, Maternal Rights
and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against Criminalizationof "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REV. 994,
1005-21 (1988) [hereinafter Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs].
For a discussion of the medical profession's view toward this issue, see, Board of Trustees,
American Med. Ass'n, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy; Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penaltiesfor Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA
2663 (1990). The report concludes that criminal sanctions or civil liability for harmful behavior
toward a fetus are inappropriate and recommends intervention through rehabilitative treatment.
Id. at 2670; see also Committee on Substance Abuse, American Acad. of Pediatrics, Drug-Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639 (1990) [hereinafter Drug-Exposed Infants]. This report advocates educating women regarding the hazards of drug use on the fetus and encouraging drug
avoidance. Drug-Exposed Infants, supra, at 642. The Academy also advocates effective drug
treatment and notes that punitive measures toward pregnant women have no proven benefit for
infant health. Id.
7. See Kathryn Schierl, Comment, A Proposal to Illinois Legislators: Revise the Illinois
Criminal Code to Include CriminalSanctions Against PrenatalSubstance Abusers, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393 (1990); see also Balisy, supra note 1, 1235-38.
8. See Meyers, supra note 6, at 55-65; Balisy, supra note 1, at 1219-32; Maternal Rights
and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 6, at 995-1009; see also, Doretta McGinnis, Prosecution of
Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505,
516-21 (1990); Kary L. Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278,
284-85 (1990).
9. See, State v. Gray, No. L-89-239, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782 (Ohio 6th App. Dist.
Aug. 31, 1990), afd, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992); Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 537 N.E.2d
721 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986).
10. Cox, 537 N.E.2d 721; Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935.
11. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (Anderson Supp. 1991). The statute reads in relevant
part: "No person, who is the parent ... of a child under eighteen years of age . . . shall create a
substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or
support." Id. § 2919.22(A).
12. Gray, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
13. S. 82, 119th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced Feb. 26, 1991).
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lyzes the pending legislation in the Ohio General Assembly and the
problems with this legislation. This comment concludes that the criminal sanctions proposed in the legislation for the maternal substance
abuser do not represent an appropriate response to this problem. Finally, this comment suggests alternatives for legal intervention.
II.

BACKGROUND: COCAINE USE AND ITS EFFECTS

The last ten to fifteen years have seen a widespread increase in the
'
use of cocaine and "crack" 14
cocaine among women, most notably,
among pregnant women and women of childbearing age. 5 Because of
their availability, cocaine and its smokeable form "crack" have become
the drugs of choice for many women.'"
The danger inherent in crack use is that the inhalation of the
smoke affects the brain much quicker than the inhalation of cocaine
powder through the nasal passages, thereby producing an instant rush
and leading to more rapid addiction as the user seeks to maintain the
exhilarated feeling. 7 One major study has shown that there is little
difference in the prevalence of the use of illicit drugs between women of
different races and socioeconomic status.1 8 In the sample population
studied, black women were more likely to use cocaine whereas white

14. "Crack" is the street term for cocaine that is processed into a freebase form by mixing
it with sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) and water. The mixture "crackles" when heated, and
the user usually inhales the vapors while smoking the mixture in a pipe. Donald I. Macdonald,
American Med. Ass'n, From the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration: Drug
Alert, 255 JAMA 1987, 1987 (1986); see also ARNOLD M. WASHTON. COCAINE ADDICTION 1416 (1989).
15. See generally Chavkin & Kandall, supra note 2; see also OHIO TASK FORCE ON DRUGEXPOSED INFANTS. OHIO DEP'T OF HEALTH. FINAL REPORT: OHIO TASK FORCE ON DRUG-ExPOSED INFANTS 11 (May 1990) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The Task Force notes that 11 percent of all babies born in the Dayton, Ohio, area hospitals in May, 1989, exhibited evidence of
cocaine exposure within two days of birth. See FINAL REPORT, supra, at 11. A urine screening
conducted at St. Vincent Medical Center in Toledo, Ohio, on infants born between May and
October, 1988, revealed evidence of drug exposure in 13 percent of newborns. Id. Most of the
mothers were in the 20-29 year age bracket, were single, and were on public assistance. Id. A
repeat study in March, 1989, showed 24 percent of infants positive for drug use. Id. In a further
study in August, 1989, the percentage had risen to 37.7 percent. Id.
16. Crack is usually sold in small vials or foil packets, and the price of doses sold on the
street can range as low as $5 to $10 per dose. See Macdonald, supra note 14, at 1987; see also
WASHTON, supra note 14, at 16. A vial may contain one or a few "rocks" or tiny pea-sized pellets,
each of which yields approximately four to five hits (inhalations) when smoked in a pipe.
WASHTON, supra note 14, at 18.
17. WASHTON, supra note 14, at 16.
18. See Andrew Skolnick, Cocaine Use in Pregnancy: Physicians Urged to Look for Problem Where They Least Expect It, 264 JAMA 306, 306 (1990). Skolnick cites a study performed
by Ira J. Chasnoff, M.D., of the Northwestern University Medical School in Chicago, Illinois. Id.
The study examined the prevalence of illicit drug use among women who received prenatal care at
five public clinics in Pinellas County, Florida, and among women who received prenatal care at
twelve out
twenty private
obstetric offices in the same county. Id.; see also Ira J. Chasnoff, et
Published
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women showed more evidence of marijuana use.19 Black women, however, were ten times more likely to be reported to public health authorities for substance abuse during pregnancy than white women.20
When a pregnant woman uses cocaine or other illicit drugs, these
drugs not only cause dependency in the woman, but also cross the placenta and reach the fetal circulatory system, thereby affecting the unborn child.2 1 Just recently, the effects of cocaine upon the fetus and the
newborn child have begun to be documented.2 2 In general, these effects
include an increased incidence of premature birth, impaired fetal
growth, and neonatal seizures.2"
After birth, symptoms of withdrawal in the newborn can include a
high-pitched cry, sweating, excoriations (abrasions or sores) on the extremities, and gastrointestinal difficulties.24 More importantly, however,
one study indicates that in utero exposure to cocaine "leads to significant impairment in neonatal neurobehavioral capabilities."2 5 Other
studies report additional serious side effects to the fetus and newborn
child. 26 While the long term effects of in utero exposure to cocaine are

al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in
Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990).
19. See Chasnoff, et al., supra note 18, at 1204. Skolnick also notes that Dr. Chasnoff has
found an increase in the number of women using cocaine prior to delivery in the belief that it will
shorten labor and "'enhance the thrill of delivery.' " See Skolnick, supra note 18, at 306. Dr.
Chasnoff warns that such binge use of cocaine near the end of a pregnancy can lead to a severe
risk to the fetus of in utero infarctions of the brain, heart, and other organs. Id. at 309. An
infarction is a sudden insufficiency of blood supply due to any one of various causes that results in
a dead area of tissue in an organ. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 779 (25th ed. 1990).
20. See Chasnoff, et al., supra note 18, at 1204.
21. Drug-Exposed Infants, supra note 6, at 639 (noting that a drug-exposed infant may
suffer withdrawal symptoms in utero when drugs are withdrawn from a dependent mother or after
delivery when the mother's use no longer directly affects the newborn child).
22. See Suzann Silverman, Scope, Specifics of Maternal Drug Use, Effects on Fetus are
Beginning to Emerge from Studies, 261 JAMA 1689 (1989).
23. See generally, Drug-Exposed Infants, supra note 6. The term neonatal derives from the
word neonate meaning the newborn child. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1029 (25th ed.
1990).
24. Drug-Exposed Infants, supra note 6, at 639.
25. Ira J. Chasnoff, et al., Temporal Patternsof Cocaine Use in Pregnancy;PerinatalOutcome, 261 JAMA 1741, 1744 (1989) (reporting the perinatal outcomes of a group pregnant
women who used cocaine as compared to a group of pregnant women with no history or evidence
of substance abuse). Specifically, the researchers in the cited study found that infants exposed to
cocaine exhibited significant impairment in the areas of orientation and motor ability and a number of abnormal reflexes. Id. at 1743.
The word neurobehavioral is a combination of the word root neuro, relating to the nerves or
nervous system, and behavior, meaning any mental or motor act or activity. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 179, 1042 (25th ed. 1990).
26. See, e.g., Rodrigo Dominguez, et al., Brain and Ocular Abnormalities in Infants with In
Utero Exposure to Cocaine and Other Street Drugs, 145 AM. J. DISABLED CHILD 688 (1991)
(reporting congenital ocular abnormalities and congenital brain malformations in infants with in
utero exposure to cocaine and-other vasoconstrictive drugs); Margot van de Bor, et al., Decreased
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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not presently known, the previously documented effects should trigger
investigations into the appropriate methods to stem the rise in maternal
drug abuse in order to preserve the health of future generations.

III.

OHIO CASE LAW

Three recent cases reported in Ohio have dealt with the problem of
maternal substance abuse.2 7 Two of these actions were originally filed
in the juvenile courts.28 The third action arose out of the criminal indictment of a woman under Ohio's child endangering statute.29
A.

In re Ruiz

Luciano Ruiz was born. on December 31, 1985, mildly premature
and somewhat undergrown, at an estimated 35 weeks gestation.30 His
mother was a self-admitted heroin addict, and the infant's urine screen
tested positive for both cocaine and heroin. 3 A diagnosis of neonatal
drug withdrawal was made and, subsequently, the Wood County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, entered an order for immediate
custody of the child by the County Department of Human Services.3 2
When the infant's mother failed to comply with the terms of the
reunification plan 33 filed by the Department of Human Services, the
Department instituted an action pursuant to Ohio's child abuse
34
statute.

Cardiac Output in Infants of Mothers Who Abused Cocaine, 85 PEDIATRICS 30 (1990) (concluding that intrauterine cocaine exposure decreases cardiac output and increases arterial blood pressure in the newborn infant).
27. See State v. Gray, No. L-89-239, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782 (Ohio 6th App. Dist.
Aug. 31, 1990), aff'd, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992); Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 537 N.E.2d
721 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C. P. 1986).
28. Cox, 537 N.E.2d at 722; Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 935.
29. See supra note II (for the text of this statute).
30. Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 936.
31. Id. The infant exhibited symptoms after birth including "irritability, pronounced jitteriness, hypertonicity, diarrhea, and initial feeding difficulty with regurgitation of food." Id.
32. Id.
33. The reunification plan called for parent-child visitation, parental training, and for the
mother to enter drug treatment and to refrain from drug usage. Id. at 936.
A case plan or reunification plan is required to be filed by any child service agency that files a
complaint alleging a child is abused, neglected, or dependent, or by an agency that has temporary
or permanent custody of a child. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.412(A) (Anderson 1990). The
general goal of the case plan is to reunite the parent and child if out-of-home placement is indicated. The case plan can also require the parents of the child to undergo mandatory counseling or
to participate in any supportive services required by the plan. Id. § 2151.412(H)(l)-(2).
34. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031(B). The statute provides that an abused child includes any child who "[i]s endangered as defined in section 2919.22 of the Revised Code, except
that the court need not find that any person has been convicted under that section in order to find
that the child is an abused child." Id. Section 2919.22(A) prohibits a parent from creating a
"substantial risk to the health or safety of the child." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson Supp.
1991).
Published
by eCommons,
1991
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The court framed the issue as "whether a finding that a child is
abused may be predicated solely upon the prenatal conduct of the
mother." 3 5 The court held that "a viable fetus is a child under the existing child abuse statute, and harm to it may be considered abuse
under R.C. 2151.031."3 6
In reaching its holding, the court reviewed Ohio case law regarding the rights previously afforded to unborn children. 37 The court specifically cited two Ohio Supreme Court decisions. The first decision extended legal protection to a viable fetus who was injured and
subsequently born alive. 3 8 The second decision allowed a wrongful
death cause of action where the child was born alive but died shortly
thereafter.3 9
The holdings in these two cases, as well as a subsequent decision,4"
enabled the Ruiz court to focus on whether an unborn, but viable, fetus
was entitled to protection under Ohio's child abuse statute. The first
decision, Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.,"' held that an unborn viable child is a person and that injuries he received were done to
his person within the meaning of the Ohio Constitution at the time of
the prenatal injury.42 The second decision, Jasinsky v. Potts,43 expanded the Williams court's interpretation of the word "person" to include an unborn viable child under Ohio's wrongful death statute.4 4

35. Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 935-36 (Ohio C.P. 1986).
36. Id. at 939.
37. Id. at 936.
38. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949).
39. Jasinsky v. Potts, 92 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1950) (holding that a wrongful death action
would lie where an unborn but viable child suffered a third-party negligently inflicted prenatal
injury and died approximately three months after birth as a result of the injury).
40. Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
41. 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949).
42. Id. at 340. Section 16 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides: "All courts shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 16.
The court in Williams specifically noted that to hold otherwise would "require this court to
announce that as a matter of law the infant is a part of the mother until birth and has no existence in law until that time." 87 N.E.2d at 340. The court determined that to so rule would
constitute adhering to "a time-worn fiction not founded on fact and within common knowledge
untrue and unjustified." Id.
The Williams court distinguished the case on its facts from a prior Massachusetts case. 87
N.E.2d at 337. In Dietrich, Adm'r. v. Inhabitants of Northampton, the court denied recovery on
behalf of a fetus based on the early common law, which bestowed legal protection at birth because
it was only then that a fetus was considered to be capable of existence separate from the mother.
138 Mass. 14 (1884).
43. 92 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1950).
44. Id. at 811.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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The Ruiz court also cited Stidam v. Ashmore,45 in which a wrongful
death action was allowed where the viable fetus was subsequently stillborn."' The Ohio Supreme Court later upheld the Stidam decision in
Werling v. Sandy. 7 The Ruiz court further noted that the Supreme
Court of Ohio had held that an unborn fetus was not a person under
Ohio's homicide statute, 48 but questioned whether the later holding in
Werling4 9 would have an effect on a future ruling under the homicide

statute. °
The Ruiz court found additional support for its holding in Roe v.
Wade, 51 which specifically stated that a state acquires a compelling interest in the life of a fetus at the point of viability.5 1 Therefore, pursuant to the "essence of Roe"" a and the developing case law in Ohio, the
court held that the unborn viable fetus was a child under the provisions
of Ohio's child abuse statute.5 4 Although the Ruiz decision stands as
good law in Ohio, its precedential effect is somewhat minimized since
the decision was rendered at the trial court level and other Ohio courts
are not bound to follow this decision.

45.
1986).

167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); see In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ohio C.P.

46. Stidman, 167 N.E.2d at 108. The court noted that the principles enunciated by the
Ohio Supreme Court in Williams and Jasinsky "lead logically and irresistibly to the conclusion
that such a cause of action does exist" for the wrongful death of a viable child which is subsequently stillborn. Id. The Stidam court noted the potential for "bizarre results" if recovery were
allowed where a child was born alive yet not allowed if the child were stillborn. Id.
47. 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985). "It is logically indefensible as well as unjust to deny an
action where the child is stillborn, and yet permit the action where the child survives birth but
only for a short period of time." Id. at 1055.
48. Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 937; see also State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1977)
(holding that a defendant driver who caused an accident, as a direct result of which a sevenmonth old viable fetus was aborted, could not be properly convicted of vehicular homicide where
the child was not born alive).
49. See supra note 47 (for holding of Werling).
50. Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 937.
51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 937.
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
53. Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 938.
54. Id. The court additionally cited with approval a Michigan case. Id. In In re Baby X, the
Michigan court held that "a newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal symptoms as a consequence
of prenatal maternal drug addiction may properly be considered a neglected child within the jurisdiction of the probate court." 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
Other courts have also agreed that prenatal use of dangerous drugs by a mother is probative
of future child neglect and have held that the juvenile court has authority to exercise jurisdiction
where a child is born under the influence of a dangerous drug. See e.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal.
Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1989); In re Valerie D., 595 A.2d 922 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); In re Stefanel
Tyeshaby
C.,eCommons,
556 N.Y.S.2d1991
280 (App. Div. 1990).
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Cox v. Court of Common Pleas

The sole issue in Cox v. Court of Common Pleas55 was whether
the juvenile court had jurisdiction to regulate an adult pregnant woman's conduct toward her unborn child.5" The state's complaint alleged
two causes of action. The first cause of action alleged that the unborn
child was a neglected child pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section
2151.03 because the mother was seven months pregnant, had used cocaine and opiates throughout her pregnancy, and had failed twentythree drug screenings during her pregnancy. 58 The second cause of action alleged that the unborn child was a dependent child pursuant to
section 2151.04 of the Ohio Revised Code.59
The juvenile court determined that it had jurisdiction to proceed in
the matter and ordered the mother to cease her use of illegal drugs and
to submit to a medical examination to determine the health of the
child.6 0 The mother failed to comply with the court's order, and the
state subsequently filed a contempt motion against the mother seeking
to have her confined to a secure drug treatment facility to prevent her
from further injuring the unborn child. 6 ' In the meantime, the mother,
who was an adult over eighteen years of age, filed an action seeking a
writ of prohibition ordering the juvenile court to cease its exercise of
jurisdiction over her. 2
The appellate court construed the issue as strictly a matter of statutory construction in issuing the writ of prohibition. The court held
that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to control the conduct
of the mother.6 " It specifically declined to answer the question of

55. 537 N.E.2d 721 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
56. Id. at 722.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 722-23. Section 2151.03 describes a "neglected child" as including any child
"[w]ho lacks proper parental care because of the faults or habits of his parents, guardian, or
custodian." OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(A)(2) (Anderson 1990).
59. Cox, 537 N.E.2d at 723. A "dependent child" is defined as any child "[w]ho lacks
proper care or support by reason of the mental or physical condition of his parents, guardian, or
custodian." OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(B).
60. Cox, 537 N.E.2d at 723. In so finding, the trial court determined that the unborn fetus
was approximately six months old and a "person." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 722. The juvenile courts in Ohio have exclusive original jurisdiction over any child
"who on or about the date specified in the complaint is alleged to be a juvenile traffic offender, or
a delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent child." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.23(A)(1). A child is defined "as a person who is under the age of eighteen years." Id.
§ 2151.011(B)(1). An adult is defined as "an individual eighteen years of age or older." Id.
§ 2151.011(B)(2).
63. Cox, 537 N.E.2d at 725. The court emphasized that the jurisdiction the General Assembly granted to the juvenile court is "exclusively statutory [and] may not be transcended." Id. at
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
724.
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whether the juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction over the unborn
child and whether the statutory definition of a "child" under the neglect statute included "an unborn child."" The court also declined to
address the issue of whether any act of the mother during the pregnancy might be the subject of litigation after the birth of the child if
born alive.6 5 The basic posture of the court was that the General Assembly might act to confer additional statutory jurisdiction, but until
that time, the court could not judicially legislate to confer additional
jurisdiction."
The lone dissenting judge determined that the mother was not entitled to any relief because, in his opinion, the mother's taking of drugs
during pregnancy constituted neglect to the child in utero under the
statute." As the concurring opinion pointed out, however, the dissent
focused on the merits of the trial court matter, rather than the issue of
jurisdiction, which was the only issue properly before the appellate
court.6
Although not specifically stated in the majority opinion, the appellate court clearly takes issue with the fact that the trial court did not
adjudge the unborn child to be dependent and/or neglected prior to
ordering the mother to cease her use of illegal drugs and to submit to a
medical examination. This is the very basis for its decision that the
juvenile court was without jurisdiction over the adult mother and the

The court rejected outright the state's contention that jurisdiction existed by virtue of Ohio
Revised Code section 2151.359, which authorizes the juvenile court to issue and to enforce any
order "necessary to ... [c]ontrol any conduct or relationship that will be detrimental or harmful
to the child." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.359(A) (Anderson 1990); see Cox, 537 N.E.2d at
724. The court specifically stated: "R.C. 2151.359 does not expand the jurisdictional limitations of
R.C. 2151.23, which establishes the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court." Cox, 537
N.E.2d at 724.
64. Cox, 537 N.E.2d at 724. The mother did not raise the issue of jurisdiction over the
unborn child. Id. at 725.
65. Id.
66. Id. The court emphasized that "no matter how 'just' the cause, a court cannot confer
jurisdiction upon itself to correct a perceived wrong." Id. To expand the jurisdiction of the juvenile court "would constitute judicial legislation and violate the fundamental constitutional principle of checks and balances .
I..."
ld.
67. Id. at 728-29 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Judge Lynch relied on the Ohio case law holding
that an unborn child is a person for the filing of a personal injury action seeking damages for
prenatal injuries. Id. at 729; see also supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. The judge also
relied on the decision of In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986), characterizing this decision as "directly on point" in support of the trial court judge's ruling. Cox, 537 N.E.2d at 729.
68. Cox, 537 N.E.2d at 726 (Whiteside, J., concurring). Judge Whiteside felt that the dissent's reliance on the prior case law granting the right of recovery for prenatal injury to a subsequently born child was inapposite in the case at bar. Id. at 727. He specifically noted that in these
cases the right of recovery after birth related back to the injury suffered prenatally and determined that these cases in no way supported the extension of rights to the child while still in the
womb.byId.eCommons, 1991
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reason why the court did not have to squarely address the issue of
whether an unborn child was entitled to protection under Ohio's juvenile statutes. This suggests that it is possible that the majority may
have confirmed the exercise of jurisdiction over the mother had the
trial court followed proper procedures.
It is not clear how the appellate court would have ruled if squarely
confronted with the question of whether the unborn child was entitled
to legal protection under Ohio's juvenile statutes. The majority sympathized with the "sentiments raised by the dissent" 9 and suggested that
the actions of the mother may give rise to an action after the birth of
the child."v Such an action might be predicated on the prior case law
decisions granting recovery for prenatal injury to a subsequently born
child, 7" as held by the Ruiz court. v2 The appellate court, however,
would not be bound by the decision in Ruiz and might once again defer
the responsibility for expanding jurisdiction under the Ohio juvenile
statutes to the General Assembly.
C. State v. Gray
Tammy Gray gave birth on July 28, 1987, to an allegedly cocaineaddicted baby.7" A Lucas County Grand Jury subsequently indicted
her in 1988 on one count of child endangerment in violation of Ohio
Revised Code section 2919.22(A).14 The complaint alleged in part that
the defendant had "recklessly create[d] a substantial risk to the health
or safety of her subsequently born child ' 7 5 due to her ingestion of cocaine during the third trimester of her pregnancy. 76 Gray moved for a
dismissal of the action on the ground that "R.C. 2919.22(A) did not
create a duty of care owed to a fetus."' 77 The motion was granted and
the state appealed.7"
On appeal, the state advanced two arguments: (1) Ohio Revised
Code section 2919.22(A) creates a duty of care to a fetus which becomes a child; and (2) even if no duty existed toward the fetus, a duty
does exist once the child is born, and the transfer of blood containing
cocaine through the umbilical cord prior to severance constitutes a vio-

69. Id. at 725.
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
72. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986).
73. State v. Gray, No. L-89-239, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782, at *1 (Ohio 6th App. Dist.
Aug. 31, 1990), affd, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
74. Id.; see supra note 11 (for relevant text of the statute).
75. Gray, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782 at *1-2.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *2.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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lation of Ohio Revised Code section 2919.22(A). 79 The court rejected
the first argument, finding the "well-reasoned decision of the trial court
to be dispositive of the issues raised by the state.""0 Relying on general
principles of statutory construction, the court also rejected the state's
second argument, finding it could not conclude that "the General Assembly intended to make a criminal act the passage of harmful substances from a mother to her child in the brief moments from birth to
the severance of the umbilical cord." 81 Accordingly, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, dismissing the complaint
against the defendant. 2
The trial court decision is vital to an understanding of the impact
of the Gray decision.8 " The trial court defined the issue as "whether
R.C. 2919.22(A) can be applied to a woman who ingests cocaine during her pregnancy when such ingestion results in.
a substantial risk to
the health or safety of her subsequently born child."8 To establish a
violation of section 2919.22(A), the state must prove: "(1) that the defendant owed a duty of care, protection or support to a child under
eighteen; (2) that the defendant violated that duty; and (3) that the
violation resulted in a substantial risk to the child's health or safety."8 5
In other words, the defendant must owe a duty of care at the time of
86
the alleged violation in order to be found guilty.
The state argued that it was not asking the court to establish a
duty of care towards the fetus. The court, however, noted the absurdity
of such an argument by asking "how can one owe a duty of care . . . to
the child to be born without owing a duty of care to the fetus?" 87
While the court agreed with the state's contention that a criminal defendant's conduct need not occur at the time the injured party is

79. Id. at *2-3.
80. Id. at *3.
81. Id. at *4.For a case upholding a conviction of the mother for passage of cocaine
through the umbilical cord to the newborn, see State v. Johnson, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991). The mother, in Johnson, was prosecuted under a statute that made it a crime to
deliver a controlled dangerous substance to a minor. Id. at 419. Evidence presented at trial showed
that the mother voluntarily ingested the cocaine and knew that the cocaine would pass to the child
after birth and prior to the severing of the umbilical cord. Id. at 420 (Cobb, J., concurring specially). The opinion engendered a sharp dissent stating that the drug delivery statute was not
intended to apply to the facts of this case. Id. at 421 (Sharp, J., dissenting). But cf People v.
Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the legislature did not intend a
woman to be prosecuted for delivery of cocaine through the umbilical cord to her newborn infant
under Michigan's drug delivery statute).
82. Gray, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782 at *4-5.
83. The trial court opinion is set forth in the appellate opinion as Appendix A. Id. at *5.
84. Id. at *7.
85. Id. at *8-9.
86. Id.
Id. at *10.
Published87.
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harmed for criminal liability to attach, the court stated that under
Ohio Revised Code section 2919.221(A), the violation of the duty of
care is the prohibited conduct, not the eventual harm."8 The court refused to interpret the statute to include a duty of care to the fetus and
held that the duty of care under section 2919.22(A) "does not arise
until a live child is born of the pregnancy." 89 Since the complaint alleged that the defendant violated a duty of care during the third trimester of her pregnancy, the mother could not be convicted because
she did not owe the unborn child a duty of care at that time. 90
The court also drew a distinction between acts of commission and
acts of omission, 9 1 noting that section 2919.22(A) had consistently been
applied to acts of parental neglect or acts of omission.9 2 The court determined that the act of ingesting cocaine clearly constituted an act of
commission. 93 Based upon this fact and the prior Ohio Supreme Court
interpretation 4 of section 2919.22(A), the court determined that the
statute was not intended to apply in this case.9 5
On February 12, 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the rulings of the trial and appellate courts in Gray.9 6 The court determined
that current criminal statutes are "to be strictly construed against the
state and liberally construed in favor of the accused."9 7 Further, the
"words and phrases in Ohio statutes are to be construed 'according to

88. Id. at *9-10.
89. Id. at *10. To hold otherwise, the court would have interpreted "the word 'child' in the
statute to include [a] 'fetus.' " Id.
90. Id. The court determined that a plain reading of the statute required a parent-child
relationship to be in existence at the time the substantial risk of harm was caused. Id. at *10-11.
The court cited with approval a California case that stated, to commit the offense of child endangering, a parent must have care, custody or control of a child " 'which presupposes the existence
of a living child susceptible to custody or control.' " Id. at * 11 (quoting Reyes v. Superior Court,
141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)). The Reyes court, interpreting a statute similar to
Ohio Revised Code section 2919.22(A) in the case of a pregnant heroin addict, determined that
the word "child" in the statute did not include a "fetus," that the language of the statute
"strongly suggested that the section was not intended to be applicable to prenatal conduct," and
that when the legislature "intended to include a fetus or unborn child within the protection of a
penal statute, it [had] done so expressly." 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913, 914.
91. Gray, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782 at *16-17.
92. Id. at *17. The court cited State v. Kamel, discussing Ohio Revised Code section
2919.22(A) and stating in relevant part: "Division (A) is concerned with circumstances of neglect
as is indicated by the committee comment to R.C. 2919.22. Manifestly, such neglect is characterized by acts of omission rather than acts of commission." Id. at *15-16 (quoting State v. Kamel,
466 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ohio 1984)).
93. Gray, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782 at *16.
94. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
95. Gray, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3782 at *16-17. In Gray, the court also deferred to the
Ohio General Assembly the decision of whether or not "to criminalize the ingestion of cocaine
during pregnancy when such ingestion results in harm to the subsequently born child." Id. at *19.
96. See State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
97. Id. at 711.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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the rules of grammar and common usage.' "98 A plain reading of Ohio
Revised Code section 2919.22(A), therefore, required that a parentchild relationship be in existence at the time of the creation of a substantial risk of harm to the child. 99 The statute did not apply to Gray's
conduct because she "did not become a parent until the birth of the
child[, nor did] the child become a 'child' within the contemplation of
the statute until [it] was born." 100 The court did note that the Ohio
General Assembly currently had before it Senate Bill No. 82 which, if
passed, would be designed to address the type of situation presented by
this case. 10 ' The court, therefore, felt it appropriate to defer to the legislature to undertake "the thorough investigation necessary to resolve
this important and troubling social problem." '0 2
D. Summary of Ohio Case Law
With the exception of one juvenile court in Ohio,103 the courts
have been unwilling to step in and judicially legislate on the issue of
whether the unborn child is entitled to protection against the mother's
prenatal acts. The recent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court in State
v. Gray'04 indicates that the court was unwilling to expand Ohio's child
endangering statute to encompass child neglect or abuse through a
pregnant woman's use of drugs or alcohol. Under the existing criminal
law, a substantial risk of harm to the child cannot be created until the
parent-child relationship comes into existence.10 5 The court, therefore,
deferred to the Ohio General Assembly the task of specifically creating
any crime of prenatal child neglect.1 06
The court in Cox'0 7 refused to consider the issue of whether an
unborn child is entitled to protection,108 holding that the juvenile court
was without jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of an adult pregnant
woman. 0 9 The Cox court also deferred to the Ohio General Assembly
the task of legislating with regard to maternal substance abuse." 0 The
juvenile court in Ruiz, "' however, boldly declared that the unborn via-

98. Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.42 (Anderson 1990)).
99. Id.at 711.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 712.
102. Id.at 713.
103. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986).
104. 584 N.E.2d at 710.
105. Id.at 711.
106. Id. at 713.
107. Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 537 N.E.2d 721 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
108. Id. at 724.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 725.
In re Ruiz, 500
N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986).
Published Il.
by eCommons,
1991

1032

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:3

ble child is a child within the definition of an abused child under Ohio
Revised Code section 2151.031.112 The Ruiz court determined viability
as the appropriate point at which the unborn child's right to life, free
13
from harm, should be protected.'
Although these three cases can be distinguished on the issues addressed by the courts in each instance, it is evident that the judicial
picture in Ohio regarding legal action for maternal substance abuse is
far from clear. It is apparent that the Ohio General Assembly must
intervene and adopt legislation that will guide the courts in their resolution of these difficult issues.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF PENDING LEGISLATION IN OHIO

Overview

In an attempt to address the growing concern associated with the
issue of maternal substance abuse, a bill was introduced into the Ohio
General Assembly on February 26, 1991.114 The bill was referred to
the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 5, 1991,115 and sponsor testimony was heard on the bill in committee hearings on July 24,
1991.116

The proposed bill would amend the definition of a "neglected
child" as found in Ohio Revised Code section 2151.03(A) 117 to include
any child "who is addicted at birth to a drug of abuse, as defined in
section 3719.011 of the Revised Code, as the result of his mother's use
'
of the drug of abuse during pregnancy." 118
According to the bill's sponsor, this provision includes the drug-addicted child within the "purview" of the Child Abuse and Neglect Law. 19 By acknowledging the
addicted newborn as a neglected child due to the mother's substance
abuse during pregnancy, this amendment indirectly recognizes the fetus

112. Id. at 938.
113. Id.
114. S. 82, 119th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991)
Cooper Snyder).
115.

(introduced by Senator

Senate Activity Report, 60 GONGWER NEWS SERVICE. INC. OHIO REPORT No. 43,

Mar. 5, 1991, at 2.
116.

Senate Activity Report, 60 GONGWER NEWS SERVICE, INC., OHIO REPORT No. 141,

July 24, 1991, at 4.
117. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(A) (Anderson 1990); see supra note 58 (for the
relevant text of section 2151.03(A)).
118. S. 82, § 2151.03(A)(8). A "drug of abuse" is defined as "any controlled substance as
defined in Section 3719.01 of the Revised Code." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.011(A) (Anderson 1988). "Controlled substance" is defined as a "drug, compound, mixture, preparation, or substance included in Schedule 1,II, III, IV, or V." Id. § 3719.01(D). Cocaine and its derivatives are
listed in Schedule I1of the controlled substances section. Id. § 3719.41, SCHEDULE II(A)(4).
119. Memorandum on the Content and Operation of Senate Bill 82 during the 119th Ohio
General Assembly, Regular Session (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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as a person under the Ohio State Constitution. 0 By amending the existing definition of a neglected child under the Ohio juvenile code, the
bill would create an additional ground upon which to bring a child neglect action against the mother of a child. 2 '
The major change the bill proposes is the creation of the new offense of "prenatal child neglect" to be codified at section 2919.221 of
the Ohio Revised Code.' 22 By its inclusion in Title 29 of the Ohio Revised Code, the bill signifies that the statute would criminalize a woman's prenatal conduct.'
One provision of the bill, to be codified at
section 2919.221(A), states: "No woman by her use during pregnancy
of a drug of abuse, as defined in Section 3719.011 of the Revised Code,
shall cause her child to be addicted at birth to a drug of abuse."'124 A
violation of section 2919.221(A) would constitute the offense of prenatal child neglect, an aggravated felony of the second degree. 2 A violator of section 2919.221(A), however, would be sentenced under the provisions of the bill, rather than under the general felony sentencing
statute.2 If the woman has not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to
a prior violation of section 2919.221(A), she may elect to "successfully
complete a drug addiction program ' ' 1 27 or "undergo implantation of a
hormonal contraceptive device, . . . participate in a five-year program
of monitored contraceptive use approved by the court, and during the
' 28 If
five-year period abstain from the addictive use of drugs of abuse."'
a woman has previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.221(A), she gets no option to elect; she is sentenced to undergo implantation of a hormonal device, to participate in
the five-year contraceptive program, and to abstain from abusing drugs
29
during that period.'

120. See supra note 42 (for language of Section 16 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution).
121. S. 82, § 2151.03(A)(8).
122. Id. § 2919.221.
123. Title 29 of the Ohio Revised Code codifies Ohio's criminal laws.
124. S. 82, § 2919.221(A).
125. Id.§ 2919.221(B).
126. Id. The general felony sentencing statute in Ohio provides penalties for an aggravated
felony of the second degree as follows: The minimum term of incarceration "shall be three, four,
five, six, seven, or eight years and the maximum term shall be fifteen years." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.11 (B)(2)(a) (Anderson Supp. 1991). Additionally, a fine may be levied against the
offender of not more than $7,500. Id. § 2929.11 (C)(2). If the offender has previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony of any degree, or aggravated murder or murder, the term of
incarceration shall be "eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve years, and the maximum term shall be
fifteen years." Id. § 2929.1 l(B)(2)(b).
127. S. 82, § 2919.221(B)(I)(A).
128. Id. § 2919.221(B)(1)(B).
129. Id. § 2919.221(B)(2). No penalties are provided for the supplier of the drugs, whether
it be by
the eCommons,
unborn child's 1991
father or another person. Apparently, the supplier, if caught, would be
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The bill also contains an enhanced penalty provision."' If the woman fails to make the election required as a first time offender or fails
to act in accordance with any sentence imposed as a subsequent offender, she will be found guilty of "aggravated prenatal child neglect,
an aggravated felony of the first degree.."13' Apparently, thewoman
would then be sentenced pursuant to the general felony sentencing
statute."12

One final provision of the bill provides that the woman sentenced
under the statute must bear the cost of taking any court-ordered action
unless she is indigent.1 33 If she is indigent and elects a drug treatment
program, the Board of Alcohol, Drug Addiction, and Mental Health in
the county in which the woman resides must pay for the treatment. 3
If the woman elects the contraceptive treatment program, the County
Department of Human Services is to assist her in finding a source of
payment for the program or procedure. 135
B.

Analysis of Pending Legislation

This subsection analyzes in detail the legislation pending before
the Ohio General Assembly. It initially addresses both sides of the current debate over criminalization of a pregnant woman's prenatal conduct. It then compares the proposed legislation to current Ohio law and
investigates potential problems with the bill's provisions. The standard
of culpability under the proposed criminal provision is examined in the
context of the physical and psychological aspects of cocaine addiction.
Finally, the bill's penalty provisions are compared to existing penalties
under Ohio law and are analyzed under constitutional standards.
1. The Debate Over Criminalization
The proposed creation of the offense of prenatal child neglect by
Ohio Senate Bill No. 82 again brings to the forefront the debate over
whether criminalization is in the best interests of the child or the

prosecuted according to Ohio's drug trafficking statute. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03 (Anderson Supp. 1991).
130. S. 82, § 2919.221(E).
131. Id.
132. The general felony sentencing statute provides an incarceration term of five, six, seven,
eight, nine, or ten years, with a maximum term of twenty-five years if there is no previous first,
second, or third degree felony or murder conviction or guilty plea. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.1 l(B)(l)(a) (Anderson Supp, 1991). If there is a prior guilty plea or conviction, the incarceration term is ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years, and the maximum term is
twenty-five years. Id. § 2929.1 l(B)(1)(b). The fine for an aggravated felony of the first degree is
not more than ten thousand dollars. Id. § 2929.1 I(C)(1).
133. S. 82, § 2919.221(D).
134. Id.
135. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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mother. 3 ' Pro-criminalization advocates maintain that voluntary drug
treatment programs and civil child abuse and neglect statutes have
been largely inadequate in dealing with the problem of maternal substance abuse.' 37 Additionally, attempts to prosecute mothers under current drug statutes have met with difficulty. 138 Criminalization of prenatal conduct is considered necessary to deter pregnant women from
abusing drugs. 1 9 Incarceration, however, must be combined with other
measures in order for the state to carry out its responsibility of rehabilitating the offender. 4 °
On the other hand, those opposed to criminalization of prenatal
substance abuse maintain that such criminalization is unwarranted because criminal laws regarding illicit substance abuse ai'e already in effect and these laws apply to all persons, not just pregnant women.'
Difficulty is also noted in defining the duty of care the mother owes to
the unborn child.' 4 2 Under the proposed legislation in Ohio, this duty
136. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
137. See Schierl, supra note 7, at 402-404. Schierl argues that state intervention occurs too
late where the state takes custody over the drug-exposed child because the damage to the child
occurs in the uterus when the mother ingests the cocaine. Id. at 404. Additionally, Schierl argues
that custody of the child is "not a sufficiently coercive factor to compel many of these women to
comply with court-ordered rehabilitation." Id.
138. Id. at 406. The major problem under currently existing statutes is the lack of notice to
women that their conduct during pregnancy may be subject to criminal sanctions. Id.
139. Id. at 408. Schierl argues that intervention through the criminal system is appropriate
because the woman's conduct is not only harmful to her body, but to the fetus and society as well.
Id. at 407. She maintains that women who continue to use drugs "will be detected and will be
treated.". Id. at 408.
Presumably, this conclusion rests on the assumption that widespread mandatory urinalysis of
newborns will be effectuated, leading to diagnoses of drug-exposed infants and, in turn, to prosecution of the mother for ingesting drugs during the pregnancy. In order for this to occur, however,
a state legislature will also have to amend its statutes to provide for such mandatory testing procedures and issue standards regarding detection levels. See Balisy, supra note 1, at 1235 (advocating
criminal penalties to deter women who abuse alcohol, drugs, or tobacco during pregnancy). Balisy
also advocates a civil cause of action for prenatal tort or diminished life against both parents of
substance-abused infants. Id. at 1236.
140. See Schierl, supra note 7, at 409. Schierl advocates the inclusion of drug treatment,
parenting programs, and educational programs, but concludes that criminal sanctions are necessary to coerce the mother's participation in such programs. Id. at 410.
141. See Wendy K. Mariner, et al., Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perils of Prosection, 9
CRIM. J. ETIics 30, 31 (1990). The authors argue that if drug use alone (as opposed to trafficking) is not a criminal offense, "then what is being punished is the status of being pregnant." Id.
The authors further note that neither prosecution, existing prohibitions, or increased penalties
have stopped distribution or use of drugs. Id.; see also, McGinnis, supra note 8, at 529 (noting
that it is difficult to maintain respect for a system that prosecutes drug-addicted mothers, arguably the victims of profit-seeking drug dealers, while the dealers are perceived as Z'going free").
142. See, Mariner, et al., supra note 140, at 32-33. The authors argue that a duty imposed
to prevent a risk of harm to the fetus is a state-imposed standard on the woman directing her in
how to care for her own body during pregnancy and encompasses lawful as well as unlawful
behavior. Id. The authors also question whether such a duty would also be owed to the state under
such a by
criminal
law. Id. at
35.
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appears to be an obligation on the part of the mother not to cause her
child to be born addicted to a drug of abuse.' 4" If a woman is to be
punished under a criminal statute, questions also arise as to culpable
mental intent. One author argues that it is not possible to create an
objective criminal standard to judge maternal conduct.' 44 By articulating an objective standard, the state punishes women in a strict liability
sense without regard as to whether these women were financially or
physically able to meet the objective standard of conduct. 4 5
Opponents of criminalization also maintain that such state action
will deter women from seeking necessary prenatal care " 6 and discourage maternal/fetal bonding. " 7 Finally, opponents maintain that criminal statutes and' sanctions will undermine the doctor-patient relationship because the doctor, in effect, must become an agent of the state
criminal justice system. " 8 Imposing criminal sanctions creates'an adversarial relationship between the doctor and patient because the doctor is required to monitor the maternal/fetal relationship and report
noncompliance to the state. " '
2.

Comparison of Proposed Legislation to Existing Ohio Law

Under the existing law in Ohio, in order for a child to be adjudged
abused, the parent must create a substantial risk to the health or safety
of the child.ss A conviction is not necessary under Section 2919.22(A),

143. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2919.221(A), (1991).
144. See McNulty, supra note 5, at 305. McNulty notes two general levels of intent in
criminal statutes: "an objective intent, requiring recklessness or negligence, and a subjective intent, requiring that the person act purposely or knowingly." Id.
145. Id.; see also McGinnis, supra note 8, at 522. Drug addiction presents unique questions
under criminal law regarding voluntary versus involuntary acts. McGinnis, supra, note 8 at 522.
McGinnis further maintains that it is unlikely that female pregnant addicts are culpable within
the accepted terms of criminal law. Id. at 523.
146. See Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During
Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J. 357, 370 (1988-89) (deterring
women from prenatal care is "perhaps the greatest danger" under adopting a scheme of fetal
neglect and endangerment laws because women will not receive adequate care, thereby resulting
in higher maternal and fetal medical problems and death).
The usual rejoinder to this charge from pro-criminalization advocates is that these pregnant
addicts do not seek out such prenatal care at present. This outlook, however, ignores the fact that
for those addicts that do currently seek care, criminalization and penal sanctions for drug addiction will probably drive them away from care.
147. See Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 6, at 1005 (arguing that fetal
abuse legislation only emphasizes the woman's perception of her fetus as a legal adversary and
able to curtail her legal rights, thereby fostering hostility between the mother and child).
148. Id. at 1011.
149. Id. On the other hand, the author argues that an education/funding approach to the
problem would encourage women to see their doctors and would foster a caring and trusting relationship between the doctor and patient. Id.
150. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson Supp. 1991).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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however, in order for the juvenile court to find that a child is an abused
child."' This was the basis for the determination of abuse in the
Ruiz 5' decision. The pending legislation in Ohio proposes both to
amend the definition of a neglected child to include one who is addicted
at birth to a drug of abuse as the result of his mother's use of such a
drug during pregnancy, 53 as well as to create the new offense of prenatal child neglect. 5 4 It is clear that a proceeding could then be instituted
under either section. If the'action is instituted under proposed section
2151.03(A)(8), it would proceed under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court in the same manner as is currently provided under the juvenile
statutes for an adjudicatory hearing' 55 and a dispositional hearing.'
On the other hand, if the action were instituted under proposed section
2919.221(A), it would proceed under the general jurisdiction of the
court of common pleas to hear criminal. matters.' 5 7
What is not clear, however, is whether the two proposed statutes
would also work in tandem, similar to the manner in which sections
2151.03 and 2919.22(A) presently operate. 1 58 It is unclear whether a
conviction under proposed section 2919.221(A) would be necessary in
order to bring an action under proposed section 2151.03(A)(8). It is
also unclear whether a dismissal or a finding of not guilty under proposed section 2919.221(A) would preclude a subsequent action in the

151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031(B) (Anderson 1990).
152. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986); see supra notes 30-54 and accompanying text (disscussing this case).
153. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2151.03(A)(8) (1991).
154. Id. § 2919.221(A).
155. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.28 (Anderson 1990). One function of the adjudicatory
hearing is to determine whether the child is an abused, neglected, or dependent child as alleged in
the complaint filed. Id. § 2151.28(A)(2). The court shall also determine at the adjudicatory hearing "whether the child should remain [with the parent] or be placed in shelter care until the
dispositional hearing." Id. § 2151.28(B).
156. Id. § 2151.35. The dispositional hearing is a separate hearing held pursuant to an
adjudication of the child as a neglected, abused, or dependent child. Id. § 2151.35(B)(1). The
court may consider any evidence that is material and relevant including medical testimony and
social services testimony. Id. § 2151.35(B)(2)(c).
The court has the power to place the child into protective supervision, or the temporary or
permanent custody of a placement agent, either parent, or foster care. Id. § 2151.353(A)(1), (2),
(4). The court may also place reasonable restrictions on the parents if the court issues an order for
protective supervision. Id. § 2151.353(C).
157. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2931.03 (Anderson 1987) (providing that the "court of common pleas has original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the
exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas").
Section 2151.23 of the Ohio Revised Code also gives the juvenile court concurrent original
jurisdiction to "hear and determine all cases of misdemeanors charging adults with any act or
omission with respect to any child, which act or omission is a violation of any state law or any
municipal ordinance." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(B)(1) (Anderson 1990).
See supra note1991
34 and accompanying text.
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juvenile court under proposed section 2151.03(A)(8). Presumably, the
answer must be that a subsequent action would be precluded under
section 2151.03(A)(8). If the evidence is insufficient to show newborn
addiction in order to convict a woman under proposed section
2919.221(A), then there can be no adjudication of the child as neglected under proposed section 2151.03(A)(8)."'
Additional problems arise over the phrase "addicted at birth" in
both proposed sections.'
Initially, criteria must be determined that
the medical profession will utilize for the diagnosis of addiction at
birth. A second issue is whether this diagnosis will depend on a newborn's urinalysis alone, or whether additional criteria are necessary to
establish a diagnosis of drug addiction. A third issue is how this diagnosis will differ from a diagnosis of cocaine intoxication, which might
not pose as serious a risk to the newborn child and for which such
criminal sanctions against the mother might be unjustified. A fourth
concern is who or what organization will be responsible for adopting
standards, or adapting currently existing standards, to comply with the
mandate of the proposed statute. Finally, reporting measures must be
adopted, or adapted from the existing statutes, in order to insure proper
and confidential reporting of test results.
These initial concerns must be addressed in order for the proposed
legislation to have any effect. The legislators considering this proposal
must conduct an investigation to determine if a standard statewide
medical protocol presently exists to diagnose drug addiction. Standardization of diagnostic criteria is essential for impartial application of
such a statute. If standardized criteria do-not exist, a method must be
implemented to develop these criteria. The same principles apply to
urinalysis testing. Without a set of standardized criteria to be implemented statewide, the danger of selective prosecution under the statute
becomes apparent. Methods also should be standardized for the reporting of such data.'

159. This is not to say, however, that a neglect action would be precluded under another
subsection of Ohio Revised Code section 2151.03.
160. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., §§ 2151.03(A)(8), 2919.221(A) (1991).
161. The Ohio Task Force on Drug-Exposed Infants has recommended periodic universal
urine testing for drugs in order to develop statistics on the number of women and children affected
by substance abuse. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 24. The Task Force recommends that
participation be mandatory for all maternity hospitals and the program be run for five years. Id.
The testing is to be conducted "based on the best available technical information at the time the
screenings are conducted." Id. It is also recommended that the screening program "be reviewed by
a panel of legal, ethical and medical experts for adequacy of procedures relative to the need for
informed consent and confidentiality." Id.; see also Adirim & Sen Gupta, supra note 3, at 292
(reporting that no state currently has statewide protocols for testing pregnant women and
newborns for illicit substances, although some hospitals have these protocols in effect). But see
Kary L. Moss, Legal Issues: Drug Testing of Postpartum Women and Newborns as the Basisfor
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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Under Ohio's current juvenile statutes, there is a mandatory reporting provision for child abuse or neglect.' 6 2 This statute requires any
professional named, acting in his official or professional capacity, who
knows or suspects that a child under the age of eighteen "has suffered
or faces a threat of suffering any physical or mental wound, injury,
disability, or condition of a nature that reasonably indicates abuse or
neglect of the child,' 6 3 to make an immediate report or cause an immediate report to be made."" The professionals listed include a "physician, hospital intern or resident, dentist, practitioner of a limited
branch of medicine or surgery, registered nurse, licensed practical
nurse, visiting nurse, or other health care professional.' 6 5
The reporting statute does contain exemptions.' 6 6 For example, the
statute contains a provision exempting the physician from reporting
physician-patient communications in accordance with section
2317.02(B)(1)1 67 of the Ohio Revised Code to which the doctor could
not testify at trial. The reporting statute also provides an automatic
waiver provision. 6 8 The physician is required to make a report where:
(1) the patient is a child under the age of eighteen;"6 9 (2) the physician
"knows or suspects, as a result of the communication or any observations made during that communication, that the patient has suffered or
faces a threat of suffering ' 170 a physical or mental injury indicating
abuse or neglect;' 7' and (3) "the physician-patient relationship does not
arise out of the patient's attempt to have an abortion without . . . notification [to] her parents."'' 72 Therefore, if the drug-exposed newborn is
viewed as the patient, the three requirements of the statute would be
met, the waiver would apply, and the statute mandates that the physician report the condition indicating abuse or neglect.

Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1406, 1409 (1990) (arguing that administration of drug testing to infants without parental consent violates parental rights).
162. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Anderson 1990).
163. Id. § 2151.421(A)(1).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. § 2151.421(A)(3).
167. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(1) (Anderson 1991). This section provides that a
physician shall not testify:
concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that relation or his advice to his
patient, . . . except that, if the patient is deemed by section 2151.421 of the Revised Code
to have waived any testimonial privilege under this division, the physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject.
Id.
168. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(A)(3) (Anderson 1990).
169. Id. § 2151.421(A)(3)(a).
170. Id. § 2151.421(A)(3)(b).
171. Id.
172.
Id. § 2151.421(A)(3)(c).
Published
by eCommons,
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The reporting statute provides civil and criminal immunity to professionals who in good faith make such reports and participate in any
subsequent judicial proceeding. 17 3 On the other hand, this section "does
not confer immunity upon those who fail to carry out the mandate of
the statute. ' 174 The reporting statute, therefore, appears to work in
conjunction with the proposed amendment of the definition of a neglected child1 75 to require reporting of any suspected incidents of neglect or abuse. Presumably, the reporting statute also works in conjunction with the section creating the new offense of prenatal child
neglect 17 although no language to this effect appears in the bill. If this
is the intention of the General Assembly, then language should be inserted in the bill to make it clear how the two sections would interact.
3.

Culpability Standard Under Proposed Section 2919.221(A)

The language of the bill also raises questions as to the standard of
culpability required under proposed section 2919.221(A).' 7 7 Ohio law
defines four mental states to describe the degrees of culpability necessary for commission of a crime: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence.171 Purpose is defined as a specific intention to cause a certain result or to engage in conduct of a particular nature regardless of
the outcome.' 7 A person acts knowingly "when he is aware that his
conduct will probably cause a certain result."' 8 0 Recklessness is defined
as disregarding a known risk where it is certain that the conduct will
likely cause a certain result. 8 ' Negligent conduct results from a lapse
of the standard of care required of a person under the circumstances,
where her conduct may cause a certain result. 8 2 Under the statute,
proof of any degree of culpable mental state is sufficient to prove all
lesser degrees. 83
The Ohio Supreme Court has previously held that recklessness is
the culpable mental state required for child endangering under Ohio
Revised Code section 2919.22(B).' 8 4 This holding was later followed by

173. Id. § 2151.421(G)(1).
174. Brodie v. Summit County Children Servs. Bd., 554 N.E.2d 1301, 1309 (Ohio 1990).
175. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.,§ 2151.03(A)(8) (1991).
176. Id. § 2919.221(A).
177. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
178. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.22 (Anderson 1987).
179. Id. § 2901.22(A).
180. Id. § 2901.22(B).
181. Id. § 2901.22(C).
182. Id. § 2901.22(D).
183. Id. § 2901.22(E).
184. State v. Adams, 404 N.E.2d 144, 145-46 (Ohio 1980) (where criminal statute fails to
designate degree of culpability, it is presumed to be recklessness, unless strict liability plainly
indicated).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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an Ohio appeals court which held that recklessness is the culpable
mental state required for child endangering under Ohio Revised Code
section 2919.22(A). 86 Following these two opinions, it is logical to conclude that since no degree of culpability is designated in proposed section 2919.221(A), the culpability standard will be recklessness.
Culpability or intent must combine with a voluntary act in order
to constitute a crime.186 Although the initial use of a drug must be
considered a voluntary act, "continued use by addicts is rarely, if ever,
truly voluntary."' 8 7 Cocaine is physically as well as psychologically addicting. 8 8 Medical studies show that the drug penetrates the brain
cells, alters the chemical activity within them, and produces changes in
the person's moods and feelings. 89 These chronic changes "may give
rise to compulsive cravings for the drug, impaired cognitive abilities,
and negative mood states, all of which will tend to fuel repeated drug
use."' 90 This raises serious questions about both the voluntariness of
the act of the pregnant addict in using cocaine and whether the requisite state of culpability, i.e., recklessness, exists.
It may be argued that a woman's initial use of cocaine, with the
knowledge that she is pregnant, is a voluntary act and, therefore, she
may be subject to prosecution. This does not, however, appear to be the
intent of the proposed legislation. The bill does not punish the mother's
initial use of the drug. Rather, it punishes the woman for causing her
child to be born addicted to the drug.19 ' In the case of the addict, it
might then be argued that the woman who is abusing cocaine or other
drugs just prior to delivery is not acting in conscious disregard of a
known risk where she is certain that her conduct will likely cause a
certain result. She is, instead, acting in response to a psychological and
physical craving that she cannot overcome without appropriate treatment. Indeed, the pregnant addict's mental state may be such that she
does not realize or even consider the possible harmful effects of her
drug use on her baby.19 2 Even if she does know that the drug is harmful to the fetus, she may be unable to act in accordance with this
93
knowledge.1

185. State v. Williams, 486 N.E.2d 113 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
186. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, § 3.11(a) (2d ed. 1986).
187. Mariner, et al., supra note 141, at 36.
188. See WASHTON, supra note 14, at 35.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2919.221(A) (1991).
192. See McGinnis, supra note 8, at 524 (likening the pregnant addict to a person suffering
from temporary insanity). McGinnis specifically notes that the American Psychiatric Association
describes alcoholism and cocaine abuse as mental disorders. Id. at 519 n.77.
193. Id. at 525.
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It must be noted that under Ohio law a criminal act may not be
excused or mitigated because it was prompted by an irresistible impulse
"when the offender has the mental capacity to know the difference between right and wrong, and to appreciate his legal and moral duty in
respect thereto."19' 4 Diminished capacity likewise has been held not to
be a defense to a crime."' Additionally, the insanity defense cannot be
successfully established simply on the basis that the condition resulted
from the use of drugs where drug use is not shown to be habitual or
chronic. 9 6 This may possibly leave open, however, the chance for a
successful insanity defense where the drug use is shown to be habitual
and chronic. Moreover, irresistible impulse or temporary insanity defenses may be successful in negating intent where the defendant does
not have the mental capacity to know the difference between right and
wrong.
The purpose of this discussion is in no way to condone the use of
drugs by the pregnant addict, but merely to emphasize the difficult issues that confront both the courts and the legislature in attempting to
deal with the problem of maternal substance abuse. The problem is not
strictly legal in nature, but also involves significant medical aspects of
both a psychological and physical nature.
4.

Analysis of Proposed Penalty Provisions

The penalty provisions of the proposed legislation also merit scrutiny. A violation of section 2919.221 (A) constitutes a felony of the second degree;' 9 7 however, the statute requires women to be sentenced according to the bill's provisions, rather than according to the existing
felony sentencing statute."9 8 A first conviction or guilty plea forces the
woman to elect between two alternatives and to act in accordance with
this election.' 99 The first alternative is for the woman successfully to
complete a drug addiction program.2 0 This may not present a major
problem, provided adequately funded and staffed drug treatment programs are available. 2 ' The bill's provisions, however, are unclear as to:
(1) whether the woman is also to be sentenced to incarceration during
this program; (2) whether these programs will be mandatory inpatient
194. State v. Schaffer, 177 N.E.2d 534, 534 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (quoting the syllabus).
195. State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990).
196. State v. Mosher, 523 N.E.2d 527 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
197., S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2919.221(B) (1991).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 2919.221(B)(1).
200. Id.§ 2919.221(B)(I)(A).
201. For a discussion regarding problems in obtaining treatment for pregnant substance
abusers, see Mariner, et al., supra note 141, at 36-37; Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant is a Crime, 9 CRIM. J. ETHIcs 41, 42 (1990).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22

MATERNAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE

19921

1043

programs; or (3) whether the woman is to be treated on only an outpatient basis. The only mention of drug treatment programs in the bill,
other than in the sentencing provision of section 2919.221, is found in
the proposed amendment to Ohio Revised Code section 340.03322
This amendment merely states that the Board of Alcohol, Drug Addiction, and Mental Health Services is to "ensure that drug addiction programs are available for women who elect or are sentenced under Section 2919.221 of the Revised Code to enter such programs. '"203
Presumably, this leaves the responsibility to the Board to obtain funding and to establish, staff, and maintain such drug treatment programs.
This, in turn, will depend upon the General Assembly approving the
necessary appropriations of funds to carry out the statute's mandate.
This is a critical factor if the sentencing provisions of proposed section
2919.221 are to be effective.
A recent study conducted by the Ohio Task Force on Drug-Exposed Infants documented the critical unmet need for treatment and
recovery services in Ohio.20 4 The Task Force strongly recommended
that "[a]ppropriate treatment and recovery programs must be assured
for all pregnant women and for all women of childbearing age, with
provisions for their children, regardless of income. ' 20 5 Regardless of the
outcome of the presently pending legislation, the funding must be appropriated if the state of Ohio hopes to properly address the problem of
maternal substance abuse.
The second alternative for a first time offender under proposed section 2919.221(A) requires the woman to "undergo implantation of a
hormonal contraceptive device, . . . [to] participate in a five-year program of monitored contraceptive use approved by the court, and during
the five-year period, abstain from the addictive use of drugs of
abuse. ' 20 6 This alternative becomes mandatory for a subsequent offender. 20 7 This penalty provision implicates many of a woman's constitutional rights, most notably, the right to privacy.

202.

S. 82, § 340.033(A)(14).

203.

Id.

204. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 32. Preliminary data "indicates the numbers of
women in Ohio needing treatment and recovery services is in the thousands." Id.
205. Id. The Task Force estimates the cost to be $90 per day in a residential treatment
center for a woman with one child. Id. At a length of nine months of treatment, this totals
$24,500 for one woman's recovery. Id. The estimated annual cost for one facility with twenty
clients is $486,000, and the estimated annual cost for seven such facilities is $3,402,000. Id.
206.

S. 82, § 2919.221(B)(1)(B).

§ 2919.221(B)(2).
Published by Id.
eCommons,
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Constitutional Implications of the Penalty Provisions

In Skinner v. Oklahoma,"" the United States Supreme Court
struck down an Oklahoma statute providing for compulsory sterilization of persons convicted two or more times of crimes involving moral
turpitude. 20 9 In striking down the statute, Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
"We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race. ' 210 He further characterized
the statute's sterilization mandate as a deprivation of a "basic
211
liberty.
The Supreme Court initially developed the modern right to privacy
in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut,1 2 in which the Court struck
down a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives by
married couples.2 1 The right to privacy is found in several Bill of
Rights guarantees that "have penumbras, formed by the emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance"2""
thereby forming a "zone of privacy" 2 5 into which the government may
not intrude through means that are unnecessarily broad.21 6 The Court
extended this holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird2 to encompass the use of
contraceptives by single persons. In the words of the Court, "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child. "'2" 8 Moreover, "where a decision as fundamental
as that to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must
'21 9
be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.

208. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
209. Id. at 536. The statute at issue in Skinner penalized habitual criminals convicted of
certain offenses, such as larceny, but not habitual criminals convicted of similar offenses, such as
embezzlement. Id. at 538-39. The apparent justification for the law was the belief that criminal
traits were inherited and that such criminals would parent potential socially undesirable children.
id. at 538. The law was struck down on equal protection grounds. Id.
210. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
211. Id.
212. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 484.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
218. Id. at 453; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right of privacy
in the abortion context).
219. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
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Taken together, these cases evidence a privacy right to reproductive autonomy that may only be infringed upon where the government
has a compelling interest. Moreover, the regulation must be narrowly
tailored so as to address only those interests. 2 0 Arguably, the state has
an interest in seeing that women remain drug-free during pregnancy so
as to give birth to healthy children. This may provide the compelling
state interest necessary for intervention in the form of drug treatment
programs.
Although the state interest may be compelling, the means proposed by the second penalty provision in the bill are not narrowly tailored in order to justify the intrusion on the women's reproductive and
privacy rights.22 1 Where such fundamental rights as procreation are
concerned, a court would be obliged to subject the means to advance
the compelling state interest to "particularly careful scrutiny. 2 22 The
penalty provision forces an invasive bodily procedure upon a woman,
i.e., implantation of a hormonal device, requires her to be monitored for
five years, and requires her to abstain from addictive drug use during
those five years.223 The implantation and forced participation in a fiveyear contraceptive program clearly run counter to the woman's fundamental privacy right of procreation. Additionally, the means that have
been chosen are not the least intrusive under the circumstances. Therefore, the state may not intrude upon such a fundamental right in this
manner.
The penalty provision is also illogical. It requires a woman to remain drug free during the five-year period, but it makes no provision
for providing drug treatment to the woman. The statute seeks to prevent the birth of children addicted to drugs. The state's compelling interest in seeing that women remain drug-free during pregnancy so as to
give birth to healthy children must be accomplished through narrowly
tailored means. The state's interest can be met through the less intrusive means of providing drug treatment and education programs for
maternal substance abusers.
The invasive procedure proposed under the second penalty provision might also be challenged on Fourth Amendment privacy
grounds.224 Through the Fourth Amendment, the Constitution forbids

220. Id.
221. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2919.221(B)(1)(B) (1991); see also
supra text accompanying note 206 (text of proposed penalty provision).
222. Roe, 410 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J. concurring).
223. S. 82, § 2919.221(B)(I)(B).
224. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
....
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although the first ten amendments known as the Bill of Rights
were originally held to be applicable only to the federal government, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
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unreasonable searches and seizures. 25 The basic purpose of the Fourth
Amendment has been characterized as to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government.22 A
woman, therefore, has a right to bodily integrity and to be free from an
unreasonable seizure of her person by state action.22 7 Again, a compelling state interest is necessary to justify an intrusion limiting this fundamental right. 2 8
Although some authority suggests the state's interest in the potential life of an unborn child may outweigh an intrusion on the rights of
the pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment,2 2 these cases have
dealt with life-threatening situations to the child that have required
prompt action.2 3 ° The state action proposed .in the pending Ohio legislation is markedly different. The intrusion through implantation of a hormonal contraceptive device is not necessary to save the life of a child.
Such an intrusion is not geared towards the compelling government interest in the potential life of an unborn child, but rather, is based on a
belief that drug abusing women are not worthy of bearing children.
Therefore, this penalty provision cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
The penalty provision of proposed section 2919.221(B)(1)(B), as
well as the enhanced penalty provision, 2 a ' also bear scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.2" 2 The statute's enhanced penalty provision provides that a woman failing to make
the required election or failing to act in accordance with any sentence
imposed shall be guilty of aggravated prenatal child neglect, an aggravated felony of the first degree.2"3 Under the current child endangering

(7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause incorporates these individual
rights and guarantees these rights to the individual as against state action. Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
225. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
226. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
227. See Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 6, at 1001-02.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 219-20.
229. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F.Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), afifd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (order for blood transfusion warranted over parents' objection on religious grounds); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274
S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (ordering Caesarian section be performed on pregnant woman over her
religious objections); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537
(N.J. 1964) (blood transfusions may be administered to save the life of mother or child despite
mother's religious objections).
230. See cases cited supra note 229.
231. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2919.221(E) (1991).
232. The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual
punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
233. S. 82, § 2919.221(E). For the terms of incarceration and fines imposed for an aggravated felony of the first degree, see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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statute,2 34 a violation creating a substantial risk to the health or safety
of a child is a misdemeanor of the first degree, unless the violation
results in serious physical harm to the child or the offender has a previous conviction for any offense towards children, in which case the violation is a felony of the fourth degree.2 35 A misdemeanor of the first degree carries a term of imprisonment of not more than six months2 36 and
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.23 7 The term of imprisonment for a felony of the fourth degree is eighteen months, two years,
thirty months, or three years, and the maximum is five years.2 3 8 The
fine for a felony of the fourth degree is not more than two thousand five
hundred dollars.2 39
The argument may be-made that the penalty provisions2 40 under
proposed section 2919.221 create a cruel and unusual punishment for
the mother because the same status of being drug-addicted and being
adjudged a child endangerer under existing section 2919.22(A) is penalized much less harshly than if the woman "causes" her child to be
born addicted. The argument in fact has been made that the cruel and
unusual punishment clause, as construed by the United States Supreme
2 41 prohibits criminalization of fetal or
Court in Robin'son v. California,
child abuse or neglect by pregnant addicts. 4 2 The Supreme Court in
Robinson characterized drug addiction as a status and accepted the
disease-type model of addiction.243 Arguably, what the State of Ohio is
attempting to do is punish the woman for the status of being drugaddicted and subsequently becoming pregnant. This situation is distinguishable solely on the basis of the maternal/fetal relationship from
crimes committed by other addicts. This relationship is so inextricably
intertwined by virtue of the fact that it is the woman who carries theunborn child within her own body. Anything a woman does while pregnant has the potential to harm the child. If we are to penalize the woman for being drug-addicted and pregnant, then we should also penalize the fathers under the proposed statute for having unprotected

234. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (Anderson Supp. 1991). For the relevant text of this
statute, see supra note 11.
235. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(D).
236. Id. § 2929.21(B)(1).
237. Id. § 2919.21(C)(1).
238. Id. § 2919.11(B)(7).
239. Id. § 2929.11(C)(4).
240. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2919.221(B)(1)(B), (B)(2), & (E)
(1991).
241. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
242. Robert Batey & Sandra Anderson Garcia, Prosecution of the Pregnant Addict: Does
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause Apply?, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1991).
U.S. at 666-67.
243.by 370
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sexual intercourse with a woman known to be a drug abuser where a
child is born of that union. The father would seem to be equally at
fault in this situation.
b.

Medical Implications of the Penalty Provisions

Questions also arise regarding the safety, efficacy, and propriety of
the implantation of a hormonal contraceptive device. The proposed
statute indicates the woman may undergo implantation of "Norplant or
a similar contraceptive device." 24 4 Norplant is a contraceptive system
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on December
10, 1990, after approximately twenty years of research and development.24 5 The system consists of six flexible, tubular, silicon-rubber capsules containing the progestin levorngestrel, a synthetic form of the female hormone progesterone. 4 6 The six tubes are inserted under the
skin in a woman's upper arm, where they slowly release the synthetic
hormone over a period of five years.2" ' Successful use of the product
' 8
"depends on correct and carefully performed subdermal insertion." 24
Norplant, however, is not without its problems. The most common
adverse side effects associated with its use are lengthened menstrual
bleeding and irregular spotting between menstrual periods.2 49 The FDA
has also indicated in a statement approving Norplant that it is contraindicated for women who have acute liver disease, unexplained vaginal
bleeding, breast cancer, or blood clots in the legs, lungs, or eyes.25 0 The
cost for the implant is estimated at approximately $500 to $600, excluding the physician's fee for insertion and removal.2 51 Even prior to
the FDA's approval of the drug, a debate over the appropriate use of
the implant began.25 2 Some have indicated that it would be a possible

244. S. 82, § 2919.221(B)(I)(B).
245. G.R. Huggins & Anne Colston Wentz, Obstetrics and Gynecology, 265 JAMA 3139
(1991).
246. Id.
247. Id.; see also Stuart L. Nightingale, From the FDA: New Contraceptive Implant System Approved, 265 JAMA 847 (1991). The cumulative annual pregnancy rate over five years is
1.1%. See generally Nightingale, supra, at 847. Pregnancy is prevented.through the inhibition of
a woman's ovulation and through thickening of the cervical mucus. Id.
248. Nightingale, supra note 247, at 847.
249. Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Approves Contraceptives Planted in Skin, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
1990, at A1; see also Jennifer J. Bush, Orange County Focus: Countywide; 4 Doctors Trained in
Contraceptive Use, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at B3 (Orange County ed.). The manufacturer,
Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, also notes such side effects as nausea,
headaches, nervousness, dizziness, acne, change of appetite, weight gain, breast pain, and hair
loss. Bush, supra, at B3.
250. See Hilts, supra note 249, at A .
251. See Bush, supra note 249, at B3.
252. See generally Malcolm Gladwell, Science Confronts Ethics In Contraceptive Implant;
Long-Term Birth Control Nears Approval, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 31, 1990, at Al.
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solution to part of the problem of drug-addicted infants, but others
worry that government intervention might be construed as an endorsement of sexual activity and note that the implant would not affect the
problem of sexually-transmitted diseases and AIDS.2 53 Others have
suggested that the appropriate use of the implant is solely on a voluntary basis and not as a device to reduce the number of drug-addicted
newborns.2 5
Apparently, the sponsors of the Ohio legislation feel that Norplant
offers a possible solution to the problem of drug-addicted infants born
in Ohio by their inclusion of section 2919.221(B)(1)(B) in the proposed
bill. This is troublesome, however, because Norplant is a contraceptive
device with demonstrable side effects. Forced implantation of this device may implicate a woman's protected First Amendment religious beliefs where a woman's religion does not condone contraceptive practices. The contraindications present yet another problem because a
complete and thorough medical history must be obtained prior to the
implant being inserted. The FDA also indicated in its instructions to
the drug's manufacturer that the company must tell physicians that
removal of Norplant must be done on demand, without any questions
asked, to any woman who wants it removed.2 55 This instruction, if followed, means that the woman sentenced in Ohio could demand removal
for any reason at any time.
Finally, there are problems of cost and personnel. The present estimated cost is $500 to $600 per implant, and the manufacturer has yet
to indicate whether or not the implant will be made available to organizations such as public health clinics at a discount.215 This is of critical
importance because under the provisions of proposed Senate Bill No.
82 the woman sentenced is required to pay for the procedure.25 7 Physicians must also be trained in how to properly insert and remove the
implant. The manufacturer indicated that by June, 1991, approximately 1,000 physicians in selected clinics and medical centers across
the country would be trained.2 58 This number is small, when compared
to the number of physicians in the United States, and it does not reflect
whether any type of priority system is being used to determine who
receives training first.

253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Hilts, supra note 249, at Al.
256. Id.
257. S. 82, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2919.22(D) (1991).
258. bySee
Hilts, supra1991
note 249, at Al.
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C. Alternatives for Legal Intervention
The most acceptable provision in the pending Senate bill is the
proposed amendment of the definition of a neglected child to include
one who is addicted at birth to a drug of abuse as the result of his
mother's use of the drug of abuse during pregnancy. 25 9 This is an
amendment to Ohio's Juvenile Code and would place the problem of
the drug-addicted and neglected child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Even this provision, however, ignores the fact that the
damage is done to the child in utero at the time the pregnant woman
abuses the drug, although the harm does not become apparent to society until the child is born.
The problem of the drug-addicted newborn child is not strictly one
of legal dimensions. It is also a problem of medical and social dimensions. A framework is already in place to deal with this problem in the
form of the Ohio Juvenile Code, as administered under Ohio Revised
Code section 2151. The Juvenile Code already contains existing definitions for neglected, 6 0 abused, 6 ' and dependent 6 2 children. By expanding the definition of the neglected child to include a drug-addicted
newborn, the General Assembly can expand the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to deal with this problem in an appropriate fashion. If a
newborn is adjudicated a neglected child at an adjudicatory hearing,2 63
the court may then determine whether the child should remain with the
mother or should be placed in shelter care until the dispositional hearing.26 4 A court appointed guardian ad litem ensures protection of the
child's interest during the juvenile court proceedings.26 5 The court has
the power to issue orders of disposition with regard to the child26 6 and,
more important, the court can issue orders to restrain or control the
conduct of the parent if detrimental or harmful to the child.26 7 In the
case of the drug-addicted newborn child adjudicated to be a neglected
child, this provision would enable the court to order the mother to attend drug treatment and other educational programs. This, in turn, negates the need to criminalize the maternal substance abuser's prenatal
conduct.

259. S.,82, § 2151.03(A)(8).
260. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (Anderson 1990).
261. Id. § 2151.031.
262. Id. § 2151.04.
263. Id.§ 2151.28.
264. Id.§ 2151.28(B).
265. Id.§ 2151.281.
266. Id.§ 2151.353.
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The Juvenile Code also contains a mandatory reporting procedure
to compel health care personnel to report suspected incidents of neglect
and abuse.2 6 Amendments to this statute should be made in order to
mandate urinalysis testing statewide for all newborn infants, and appropriate standards and criteria for diagnosing newborn drug addiction
should be developed and implemented. These test results should not,
however, be used for the basis of a criminal investigation of the mother.
Reunification plans prepared by social service workers must also be
cognizant of the recovering addict's needs. Drug treatment programs
should also focus on parenting education and training for vocational
skills in order to rehabilitate the woman to become a productive member of society.
In summary, the provisions of the Juvenile Code are well-suited to
dealing with the problems of maternal substance abuse through the
amendment of the neglected child definition to include a child who is
born addicted to a controlled substance. The interplay between the social services, medical profession, and legal profession under the Juvenile Code serves to provide a more trusting and caring framework
within which to address and eventually remedy the problem of maternal substance abuse. The Ohio General Assembly should seriously consider and implement the philosophy and recommendations of the Ohio
Task Force on Drug-Exposed Infants.2" 9 Appropriate funding legislation must also be introduced in the General Assembly for adequate
drug prevention, treatment, and educational programs.
Finally, the General Assembly should also study the legislation enacted or pending in other jurisdictions dealing with the problem of maternal substance abuse. For example, Florida has expanded its definition of harm under its child abuse and neglect laws to include physical
dependency of a newborn on a controlled substance, but provides that
no parent shall be subject to a criminal investigation solely on the basis
of the infant's drug dependency.2 71 Illinois and Minnesota have similarly amended their definitions of child neglect. 7 1 Other states, including Iowa, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma, have revised their reporting

268. Id. § 2151.421.
269. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 15. The Task Force's philosophy is that treatment, not
punishment, should be the primary method of rehabilitating substance abusers, that prevention is
the key, and that solutions to the problem must be based in the local community. Id. at 8. The
Task Force does not advocate mandatory reporting of women for use of illegal drugs, but believes
that evidence of such use should lead to a referral for treatment and services only. Id.
270. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503 (West Supp. 1991).
271. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2053 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.
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§ 626.556(c)
(West Supp. 1991
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statutes to require reports to be made where there is evidence in the
child of dependence or exposure to controlled substances.272
In addition, other states have legislation pending regarding maternal substance abuse or have recently passed legislation addressing this
problem. Currently, Michigan has a bill pending to amend its definition
of child neglect to include the situation where a newborn child's blood
or urine contains any amount of a controlled substance or a metabolite
of a controlled substance.2 3 Missouri also has recently passed a bill
requiring, as of January 1, 1992, that all physicians providing obstetrical care and gynecological treatment counsel pregnant women regarding the effects of smoking cigarettes, use of alcohol, and the use of
controlled substances.2 74
V.

CONCLUSION

The current crisis of maternal substance abuse endangers not only
the health of women of childbearing age, but also the health and lives
of their unborn and subsequently born children. The widespread availability of cocaine and "crack" cocaine has made these drugs the drugs
of choice for many women. Although the long-term effects of in utero
cocaine exposure on infants is not currently known, the immediate effects are manifesting themselves in premature birth, impaired fetal
growth, neonatal seizures, and neurobehavioral deficits. In Ohio, it is
estimated that pregnant women and women of childbearing age currently needing drug treatment and recovery services number in the
thousands.
The Ohio courts, with the exception of one reported case, have
been reluctant to step in and declare that the unborn child is deserving
of protection under either the Juvenile Code or the child endangering
statute. In an attempt to remedy this problem, the Ohio General Assembly is currently considering a bill that would expand the definition
of a neglected child under the Juvenile Code, as well as create a new
criminal offense of prenatal child neglect. Whereas the amendment of
the Juvenile Code represents an appropriate response to the problem,
the criminal provision represents an inappropriate response and suffers
from numerous shortcomings, constitutional and otherwise.
272. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.77 (West Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 119,
51A (West Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1991).

§

273. H.R. 4124, 86th Mich. Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced Feb. 7 1991).
274. S. 190, 86th Mo. General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1991) (codified at Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 191.725-.745 (Vernon Supp. 1992)). The legislation also calls for drug education in
grades one through twelve regarding the effects of drugs on the newborn; for the establishment of
a toll-free information line providing information and resources for treatment and referral; and
that pregnant women referred for substance abuse treatment will be first priority users of availahttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/22
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The Ohio General Assembly should abandon its attempt to
criminalize maternal substance abuse. The proper solution lies not in
punishing the maternal substance abuser for her drug addiction, but in
treatment and rehabilitation to bring the abuser back into the mainstream of life as a productive and protective parent. The Ohio Juvenile
Code presents the appropriate framework for dealing with this problem
through its integrated approach of the legal, medical, and social services professions. Therefore, the Ohio General Assembly should focus
its attention on expanding the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system
as a means of dealing with the growing problem of maternal substance
abuse. The General Assembly should enact treatment and prevention
legislation, as well as appropriate funding legislation, to ensure that the
legal, medical, and social services professions work in concert to solve
this problem.
Deborah Ann Bailey
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